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THE WARSAW SYSTEM AND THE U. S.
CONSTITUTION REVISITED
DONALD M. HASKELL*
The Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Interim Agreement
provide effective limits on recovery for wrongful death in interna-
tional flights. In this article Mr. Donald M. Haskell argues for the
validity of these international agreements under the United States
Constitution. His analysis includes an examination of the supre-
macy clause and the treaty-making power of the federal govern-
ment, the separation of powers and political question doctrines of
judicial abstention, and the application of due process and equal
protection principles to claims arising from international air trage-
dies.
N VIEW of the elimination of monetary limitations in wrongful
death actions by most states in this country, and the general trend
toward the abolition of all monetary restrictions to recovery by an
injured party, the constitutional validity of monetary restrictions
in recovery for injury or death in international air travel becomes
increasingly important both to passengers and to airlines. For many
years, the United States has been a party to an international treaty,
commonly known as the Warsaw Convention, that deals with the
rights and obligations of passengers and airlines in international
air travel. This article is addressed to the validity of this treaty, and
the agreements related to it, under the United States Constitution.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, commonly referred to as the
"Warsaw Convention,"' is an international treaty that governs the
* J.D., University of Michigan. Mr. Haskell is a partner in the firm of Mc-
Kenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Haskell, Chicago, Illinois.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
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liability of airlines in international air transportation. The Warsaw
Convention was the result of international conferences held in Paris
in 1925 and in Warsaw in 1929. Since it appeared at that time
to many countries that international air transportation was going
to bring together many different nations with differing languages,
customs, and legal systems, it was deemed desirable to establish a
certain degree of uniformity in international air transportation by
international agreement. It was also deemed desirable to restrict
air carrier defenses and to establish the principle of limitation of
liability to afford a more definite basis of recovery, to lessen litiga-
tion, and to aid in the development and maintenance of interna-
tional air transportation.
The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transpor-
tation ... performed by aircraft for hire."' International transpor-
tation is defined as transportation between two contracting coun-
tries or, when the origin and destination are in the same contracting
country, transportation with an agreed stopping place outside that
country Whether the Warsaw Convention is applicable to inter-
national air transportation is dependent on the ticket issued by the
airline to the passenger.
For all practical purposes, the Warsaw Convention creates a
presumption of liability of the airline to the monetary limit. The
Treaty provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place onboard the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations or embarking or disembarking."
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for him or them to take such measures .... '
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed
to by the negligence of the injured person the court may, in ac-
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq., T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention].
'Warsaw Convention, article 1.
'Id.
4 Id. at article 17.
5 Id. at article 20.
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cordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier
wholly or partly from his liability.'
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs [ap-
proximately $8,300] . . . . Nevertheless, by special contract,
the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of
liability."
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the dam-
age is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part
as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is sub-
mitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct."
The Warsaw Convention became effective on February 13,
1933, ninety days after its ratification by five of the high contract-
ing parties of the Warsaw Conference.! The United States was not
a party to either the Paris conference of 1926 or the Warsaw Con-
ference of 1929, although the United States did have an observer
in attendance at the Warsaw Conference. After ratification of the
treaty by several European countries, the United States began to
consider the Convention; and, upon the recommendation of the
Commerce Department and the State Department, President Roose-
velt submitted the Treaty to the United States Senate. On June 15,
1934, the Senate gave its advice and consent. The United States
then deposited its instrument of adherence on July 31, 1934, and
President Roosevelt proclaimed adherence to the Treaty in Octo-
ber 1934.10
Thus the United States can be considered almost a charter mem-
ber to the Treaty, having adhered to it about a year after it had
come into force, and after it had been ratified by several European
countries. The Treaty has, therefore, been in effect for over thirty-
nine years, and has been implemented by the executive department
of the United States Government continually since that time. Most
'1d. at article 21.
' Id. at article 22.
Id. at article 25.
SId. at article 37.
1 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Geopp v. American
Overseas Airlines, Inc., 281 App. Div. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952); afl'd mem.,
305 N.Y. 83, 114 N.E.2d 37 (1953); cert. denied, 346 U.S. 874 (1953); Wyman
v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
afl'd, 267 App Div. 944, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944), 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944); Ross
v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
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of the major countries of the world have adhered to the Warsaw
Convention for many years."
Following World War II the governments that had adhered to
the Warsaw Convention began to consider revising it. Most of these
discussions questioned whether the limit of liability had been set
at the proper level." After years of discussions and meetings, a
diplomatic conference was convened at the Hague in 1955. The
resulting Hague Protocol made certain changes in the Warsaw Con-
vention, including a doubling of the monetary limits to $16,600."
Sufficient public pressure in this country was advanced in opposi-
tion to the low limit of liability so that the Hague Protocol was not
ratified by the United States.
Finally, public pressure in opposition to the low limit of liability
of the Warsaw Convention caused President Johnson to announce
the decision of his Administration to withdraw from it; and, on No-
"The following are the countries of the world that adhere to the Warsaw
Convention Treaty: Algeria; Argentina; Australia including Papua, Norfolk
Island, and trust territories of New Guinea and Nauru; Austria; Barbados; Bel-
gium; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burma; Cameroon; Canada; Ceylon; China,
People's Rep.; Colombia; Congo (Brazzaville); Congo (Kinshasa); Cuba; Cyprus;
Czechoslovakia; Dahomey; Denmark, not including Greenland; Ethiopia; Finland;
France, including French colonies; Gambia; Germany, Dem. Rep.; Germany,
Fed. Rep.; Ghana; Greece; Guinea; Guyana; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indone-
sia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Japan; Kenya; Korea, Dem.
Rep.; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Lichtenstein; Luxembourg; Mada-
gascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Mongo-
lian People's Republic; Morocco; Nepal; Netherlands, including Surinam and
Curacao; New Zealand; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Philippines; Poland,
including Free City of Danzig; Portugal; Rumania; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra
Leone; Singapore; Somali Republic; South Africa, including Southwest Africa;
Southern Yemen; Spain, including colonies; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland;
Syrian Arab Republic; Tanzania; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Uganda; Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Arab Republic; United Kingdom; United
States; Upper Volta; Venezuela; Viet-Nam; Western Samoa; Yugoslavia and
Zambia. Listed in 1 L. KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01 [3] (1971).
1" For an exhaustive discussion of the background and history surrounding
the Warsaw Convention Treaty, the Hague Protocol, and the Montreal Interim
Agreement, see Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM.
519 (1967); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967).
" For background information leading to the modifications of the Hague Pro-
tocol, see Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929 as Amended by the Pro-
tocol Signed at the Hague on September 28, 1955, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 414
(1955); Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L.
& COM. 253 (1956); Parker, The Adequacy of the Passenger Liability Limits of
the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 37 (1947); Wetter, Possible
Simplification of the Warsaw Convention Liability Rules, 15 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1
(1948).
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vember 15, 1965, a formal intent to denounce the Treaty was
filed.' Under article 39 of the Treaty, the denunciation was to be-
come effective six months after filing. The effect of the threatened
denunciation by the United States was devastating, immediate and
obvious to other countries. Since United States airlines carried a
major portion of passengers who flew on international flights, and
since the United States was either the point of origin or destination
for many international flights, the effect of possible United States
withdrawal from the Treaty was of definite and major concern. At
the same time that the notice of denunciation was deposited, the
United States let it be known that if the adherents to the Warsaw
Convention were to agree to liability limits of about $75,000 per
passenger, the United States was prepared to withdraw its notice
of denunciation prior to the time it would go into effect. Under the
threat of denunciation of the Treaty by the United States, the Mon-
treal Conference convened in 1966.
At the Conference, the United States delegation took the posi-
tion that although the continued maintenance of an international
treaty system in international air transportation was desirable, the
limitation of liability per passenger must be raised. Several plans
were proposed and discussed, resulting in an eleventh hour agree-
ment among the participating governments that the monetary limi-
tation contained in the Warsaw Convention would, in effect, be
increased to $75,000 per passenger. The United States then agreed
to withdraw its denunciation.'
11 Any party could withdraw under article 39.
15 In addition to most United States air carriers, the following foreign air
carriers are among the signatories to the Montreal Interim Agreement: Aer Lingus
Teoranta; Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta; Aerolineas Argentinas; Aerolineas Peruanas,
S.A.; Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A.; Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.; Air
Afrique; Air Canada; Air France (Compagnie Nationale Air France); Air India;
Air Jamaica (1968) Ltd.; Air New Zealand Ltd.; Air Panama International,
S.A.; ALIA-The Royal Jordanian Airlines; Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-
S.p.A.; All Nippon Airways Company, Ltd.; ALM Dutch Antillean Airlines;
Area Ecuador Airlines; Austrian Airlines; Bahamas Airways, Ltd.; British Euro-
pean Airways Corporation; British Overseas Airways Corp.; British United Air-
ways (Services), Ltd.; British West Indian Airways, Ltd.; Caledonian Airways(Prestwick), Ltd.; Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd.; China Airlines; Compania
Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A.; Cyprus Airways Ltd.; Czechoslavak Airlines; El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.; Empresa Guatemalteca de Aviacion; Ethiopian Airlines
S.C.; Finnair, Aero O/Y; Flightexec, Ltd.; Flugfelag Islands, H.F. (Icelandair);
Fowler Aircraft Rentals, Limited; Great Lakes Airlines, Ltd.; Great Northern
Airways, Ltd.; Harrison Airways, Ltd.; Iberia Air Lines of Spain; Icelandic Air-
lines, Ltd. (Loftleider); Iraqi Airways; Japan Air Lines; Jugoslovenski Aero-
1973]
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The Montreal Interim Agreement relates only to flights which
include a point of origin, destination, or agreed stopping place in
the United States (according to the ticket issued). The Agreement
provides that the limit of liability of the air carrier shall be $75,000
inclusive of legal fees and costs, and further provides that the air
carriers shall not avail themselves of any defenses under Article 20
of the Convention or as amended by the Hague Protocol. The
Agreement further provides that it does not affect the rights and
liabilities of the carrier with regard to any claim brought by, on
behalf of, or in respect of any person who has wilfully caused dam-
age that resulted in death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a
passenger.
The net effect of the Montreal Interim Agreement is to create
almost absolute liability on the part of the adhering airline (re-
gardless of the airline's innocence) and to establish a per passenger
limit of liability of $75,000, breakable only by proof of wilful and
wanton misconduct on the part of the airline.
The Montreal Interim Agreement did not amend the text of the
Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol, and the Warsaw Con-
vention remains intact as an international treaty. Under the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement, the participating air carriers, in accord-
ance with Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, provided for
an increase in a higher limit of liability-to $75,000, and further
agreed to waive certain defenses that were provided in the Warsaw
transport (JAT); KAR-AIR oy; KLM Royal Dutch Airlines; Korean Air Lines,
Inc.; Lebanese International Airways; Leeward Islands Air Transport Services,
Ltd.; Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile (LAN); Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.;
Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A.; Lloyd International Airways, Ltd.; Lufthansa
German Airlines; Luftverkersunternehmen Atlantis AG; Malaysian Airways,
Ltd.; Malta Airways Company, Ltd.; Martin's Air Charter; Middle East Airlines
Company, S.A.L.; Midwest Airlines, Ltd.; Millardair, Ltd.; Moore Aviation,
Ltd.; Nordair, Ltee.-Nordair, Ltd.; Olympic Airways, S.A.; Pacific Western Air-
lines, Ltd.; Pakistan International Airlines (PIA); Philippine Air Lines, Inc.;
Polynesian Airlines, Ltd.; Qantas Airways, Ltd.; Sabena Belgian World Airlines;
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS); Seagreen Air Transport; Servicio Aereo
de Honduras, S.A.; South African Airways; Sudan Airways; Sudflug, Suddeutsche
Fluggesellschaft MbH; Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd.; TACA International Air-
lines, S.A.; TAN Airlines; Transair, Ltd.; Transavia Holland, N.V.; Transglobe
Airways, Ltd.; Union de Transports Aeriens; United Arab Airlines; Varan Air-
Siam Air Co., Ltd.; Varig Airlines (S.A. Empresa de Viacoa Aerea Rio Gran-
dense); Venezolana International de Aviacion, S.A.; Wardair Canada, Ltd.;
Zambia Airways. Listed in 1 L. KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 12A.03
(1971).
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Convention as they apply to international transportation involving
the United States."
In its order approving the Agreement entered into pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention, the Civil Aeronautics Board stated:
The signatory carriers provided by far the greater proportion of
international transportation to, from, and within the United States.
The agreement will result in a salutory increase in the protection
given to passengers from the increased liability amounts and the
waiver of defenses under Article 20(1) of the Convention or Pro-
tocol. The United States government has concluded that such ar-
rangements warrant withdrawal of the notice of denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention. Implementation of the agreement will
permit continued adherence to the Convention with the benefit to
be derived therefrom, but without the imposition of the low liability
limits therein contained upon most international travel involving
travel to or from the United States ....
Upon consideration of the agreement, and of matters relating
thereto of which the Board takes notice, the Board does not find
that the agreement is adverse to the public interest or in violation
of the Act and it will be approved." '
Although the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Interim Agree-
ment are in full force and effect today, it is worth noting that an-
other amendment to the Treaty has been signed. In February 1971,
representatives of many governments, including the United States,
convened in Guatemala City to consider additional revisions to the
Warsaw Convention. These revisions, now known as the Guate-
mala Protocol, will, if ratified by the United States, raise the air-
lines' limit of liability to at least $100,000, unbreakable for any
reason, and make the airlines' liability absolute-that is, on a "no-
fault" basis."8 In addition, other proposals relating to supplementary
"The Agreement was embodied in Agreement CAB 18900 and filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to § 412(8) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 and Part 261 of the Board's Economic Regulations. See 49 U.S.C. § 1502,
"Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Order Ap-
pointing Settlement."
17 Id.
" See Mankiewicz, Protocol of Guatemala City Ito Further Amend the 1929
Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519 (1972); Fitzgerald, Guatemala
City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, 9 CAN. YEARBOOK INT'L L. 219
(1971); Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw Convention and the Supple-
mental Plan under Article 25-A; A Proposal to Increase Liability and Establish
a No-fault System for Personal Injuries and Wrongful Death in International Avi-
ation, 5 NYU INT'L L. AND POLMcs 313 (1972); Mankiewicz, WARSAW CONVEN-
TION: 1971 PROTOCOL OF GUATEMALA CiTy, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1972).
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payments to United States citizens are also being considered."'
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION TREATY
There has been no reported case in which a court of review has
held the Warsaw Convention to be unconstitutional on any ground.
Of the four reported cases which have considered the constitutional
issue, three appellate courts have specifically rejected arguments of
unconstitutionality, and one case at the trial court level did not
really decide the issue because that court ruled the Treaty was
inapplicable on other grounds.
The trial court in Garcia v. Pan American Airways,"0 specifically
rejected the argument of unconstitutionality presented by the plain-
tiff, stating:
Under the facts and the law, I am impelled to reject plaintiff's
contention that the treaty resulting from the said Convention is
unconstitutional ....
The power to declare a law unconstitutional should be exercised
cautiously by a lower court and avoided, if possible; and unless it
appears clearly, without the slightest doubt, that the law is uncon-
stitutional, it is the better practice for the lower court to assume
its constitutionality until the contrary is declared by a court of ap-
pellate jurisdiction. This policy is especially desirable where the
law is of great importance and far-reaching effect; or, if the law
has been effective for an appreciable period of time."
On appeal, the plaintiff apparently argued that the Convention's
limitation was invalid on grounds of public policy, rather than on
constitutional grounds. The appellate court stated that the War-
saw Convention overrides the public policy of the State of New
York, and held that no constitutional provision existed requiring
higher liability limits than those contained in the Treaty.'
Since the Guatemala Protocol amends the 1929 treaty (Warsaw Convention) the
United States Constitution requires ratification by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, before the revisions become effective. U.S. Const. art.
II S 2. As an aside, the neA; Massachusetts "no-fault" bill in automobile matters
has been held constitutional. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
1" See Tomkins, The Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Proposed Provisions
of 1971, 6 FORUM 151 (1971).
2050 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1944).
'
11d. at 251.
-295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946).
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The district court in Indemnity Insurance Company of North
America v. Pan American Airways," also rejected a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention. The court stated
that the Treaty did not impinge on Congress' power to regulate
commerce or deprive the plaintiff of his property without due pro-
cess because "statutes for the limitation of liability are no nov-
elty."" The court in Pan American cited, in support of its state-
ment, two United States Supreme Court decisions'" that upheld the
validity of the liability limitation provisions of the Federal Mari-
time Act2' and the Workmen's Compensation statute of the State
of Washington.'
In Pierre v. Eastern Airlines,' the plaintiff contended that the
Warsaw Convention deprived him of his constitutionally guaran-
teed right to trial by jury. The court rejected this contention, con-
cluding that the limitation of damages was not in contravention
of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution. The court
stated:
In many instances, such as the limitation of liability in admiralty
cases . . . and the construction of various State Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts, it has been held that there was violation of neither
due process clause . .. nor the right to trial by jury . . . of the
Amendments to the Constitution. In all such modifications of legal
practice, it would seem, analogically at least, that the assessment
of damages is not to be considered an exclusive function of the
jury.'
In Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,"0 a decision of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Judge Nicholas J. Bua ren-
dered an opinion in 1969 (later withdrawn) in which he stated, in
dictum, that the damage limitations of the Warsaw Convention
were unconstitutional. Judge Bua, however, did not consider the
Treaty's foreign policy ramifications, and, in general, glossed over
2258 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
2l d. at 340.
21 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) and Providence
and New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883).
2646 U.S.C. §§ 182, 183 (1970).
2 7 WASH. REV. L. ARM. §$ 51.04.010-51.98.050 (1972).
20 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
291 d. at 488.
10 10 Av. Cas. 18,151 (1st opinion); 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (2nd opinion).
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the Convention's status as a Treaty of the United States, stating,
per dictum, merely that the limitation contained in the Warsaw
Convention ($8,300) was "arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and
indefensible."'" Before an order was entered pursuant to this opin-
ion, a motion for rehearing was granted and a new opinion filed
in which the court merely held that the Warsaw Convention was
inapplicable on the facts of the case. The case was later settled.
Thus there has not been any final decision by any court, either
trial or appellate, that the limitation of liability provisions con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention are unconstitutional. There are
at least three decisions, Garcia, Indemnity Insurance Company,
and Pierre, in which appellate courts specifically have held that the
Treaty limitation is not in contravention of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. Nor has
any court held the Montreal Interim Agreement, enacted pursuant
to the Warsaw Convention, unconstitutional or invalid on any
grounds.
III. TREATY POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
A. International Treaty Versus State Public Policy
A public policy of a state clearly must bow to the overriding
policy of a treaty of the United States. The leading case on this
point is Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,' in which the
court relied upon and quoted extensively from both Garcia," and
Indemnity Insurance Company." In rejecting the plaintiff's conten-
tions, the court stated:
Georgia public policy does not control these actions. Federal pub-
lic policy controls, and Federal public policy authorizes limitations
of liability in international transportation by aircraft as shown by
the United States' adherence to the Warsaw Convention ....
Federal public policy authorizes limitation of liability in interna-
tional air transportation by aircraft in the amount of $8,300.00.
... Regardless of the consequences, this Court is bound by the
"Id. at 18,161.
"229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964), afl'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
" Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946).
'4 Indemnity Insur. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F.
Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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Treaty, the decisions, and the public policy established by the
Treaty.'
In Kelley v. Sabena' the court, in determining that.the Warsaw
Convention Treaty overrode state law stated that:
Although plaintiffs have made some reference to New York's strong
public policy against monetary limitation in wrongful death ac-
tions, it is clear that this state policy is irrelevant. Even if the
Kilberg doctrine were not otherwise inapplicable, it is well settled
that it would be inapplicable in light of the fact that the Conven-
tion, and the limitations contained therein, is the Law of the Land
and must be applied, notwithstanding contrary state law or public
policy."
B. Separation of Powers
The legal effect of an international treaty entered into by the
United States stems from the United States Constitution, 8 which
states that the laws of the United States shall be made pursuant to
the Constitution "and... all treaties made ... under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ....",'
In an effort to determine just how "supreme" a treaty may be, the
courts have litigated not only problems involving the counterbal-
ancing of treaties with constitutional provisions, but have also con-
sidered the exact wording of the Constitution's clause itself.
Despite abundant opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court of
the United States has never declared a treaty unconstitutional, and
has refused to enforce only one executive agreement.' The con-
troversy over the wording in the Constitution about the supremacy
of treaties has been minimized in a conceptual sense, by declaring
"Id. at 810-11.
88242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), citing Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961); Pearson v. North-
east Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963);
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); U.S. CONST.
art. VI, el. 2; Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D.
Ga. 1964); Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 App.Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d
317 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd per curiam, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
31Id. at 145.
18 U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and Power Authority of the
State of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538, 542 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
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treaties to be "subject to" the Constitution. The manner in which
the case law has developed, however, is significant because this de-
velopment has flavored several important judicial expressions of
the treaty-making power of the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the government.
The controversy originally arose from the language of the Con-
stitution that the laws of the United States have to be made "pur-
suant to the Constitution" and that the treaties are "under the
authority of the United States." In the words of James Madison,
"this insertion was meant to obviate all doubts concerning the force
of treaties pre-existing ..."' the drafting of the Constitution. In
other words, the constitutional language does not put treaties be-
yond the Constitution, but rather gives effect to treaties entered
into during the early days of the republic. The United States Su-
preme Court has agreed with this analysis."
Nevertheless, close analysis of the long line of Supreme Court
cases involving international treaties discloses that although the
Supreme Court has accepted this principle, it has minimized it by
consistently refusing to find a constitutional violation in an inter-
national treaty properly entered into by the legislative and executive
departments of the government. Or, to put it another way, the Su-
preme Court has always found that the executive and legislative
departments of the federal government have not violated constitu-
tional prohibitions in the furtherance of international affairs and
treaty obligations. The reasons for this historical development are
well defined.
The United States has had a long history of permitting the ex-
ecutive department of the federal government, with or without con-
sent of the Senate, to have an enormous amount of discretion in
this government's relations with foreign countries. The opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Curtis
Wright Export Corporation,' is perhaps the leading expression of
this attitude. In Curtis Wright, the President requested Congress to
pass a special resolution prohibiting American citizens from provid-
ing arms to the Chaco Rebellion. The Supreme Court reversed a
41 McLaughlin, Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 709, 729 (1958).
" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
4"299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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lower court decision that had held that no authority existed to limit
the activities of American citizens under the factual situation pre-
sented to the court. In a sweeping opinion the Supreme Court af-
firmed the principle that the federal government, especially the ex-
ecutive, possessed strong powers involving external sovereignty.
Since treaties and executive agreements are the means by which the
authority of the federal government is exercised, the Supreme Court
made it clear that international agreements that may impinge on
certain domestic rights of United States citizens can nevertheless be
constitutionally valid; and, in Curtis Wright, held it constitutionally
valid for the federal government to prevent American businessmen
from making a profit from the Chaco Rebellion. The Supreme
Court has upheld the validity of many other treaties and executive
agreements. They will be considered invalid only if they are de-
clared to contain the most blatant constitutional violations, and,
to date, this has not happened."
DeGeofroy v. Riggs' provides one of the earliest expressions of
the Supreme Court's attitude toward the treaty making power:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms un-
limited except by those restraints which are found in that instru-
ment against the action of the government or of its department,
and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of
that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids .... But with these
exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the ques-
tions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly
the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
Although there are many other Supreme Court opinions that in-
dicate this same point of view, the Court has invariably refused to
hold any treaty to be in violation of the Constitution. For exam-
ple, in State of Missouri v. Holland," Justice Holmes upheld the
constitutionality of a treaty that regulated migratory birds in con-
travention of certain state statutes. The State of Missouri alleged
an unconstitutional interference with its tenth amendment right to
"A treaty requires the advice and consent of the United States Senate while
an executive agreement does not. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942),
citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
133 U.S. 258 (1890).
"Id. at 297.
47252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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regulate affairs that were not explicitly granted to the federal gov-
ernment in the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected these al-
legations, holding that the treaty did not conflict with any prohibi-
tions contained in the Constitution and that no "invisible radiation"
existed from the tenth amendment. Although the Court stated that
"we do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the
treaty-making power . . ."" it explained that the presumption of
validity of a treaty was extremely heavy because "here a nation-
al interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of anotherpower. ''W
In United States v. Pink"0 the Supreme Court rejected allegations
of deprivation of property without due process of law from expatri-
ated Russian nationals after the United States Government entered
the Litvinov Assignment with the newly recognized Soviet Govern-
ment. This agreement, in effect, deprived the nationals of their
financial interest in a defunct Russian insurance company. The
Supreme Court ruled that the foreign policy considerations of the
assignment outweighed the expatriots' claims. In Pink, the claim-
ants clearly, although constitutionally, were deprived of their prop-
erty rights by the terms of an international agreement enacted in
the interests of the United States.
The restraint with which the courts of the United States have
considered the validity of an international treaty on constitutional
grounds is consistent with normal judicial practice. It is well set-
tled, for example, that a court will not declare a statute unconstitu-
tional if the statute before the court is otherwise deemed inapplica-
ble under the facts presented to the court. 1
Whenever the Warsaw Treaty's limitation has actually been held
not to apply, it has been because of certain procedural defects, not
because the Treaty, in and of itself, is in violation of the United
States Constitution. For example, in Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines," the
court held that the limitation of the Treaty did not apply because
48 Id. at 433.
49 Id. at 435.
-0315 U.S. 203 (1942).
51 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
52370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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of the lack of proper notice on the ticket given to the passenger.
In dissenting, however, Judge Moore stated that:
The majority of their opinion indulge in judicial treaty making
. .the original limitations in the Convention may well be out-
moded by now. Substantial revisions upward have been made but
they have been made, as they should be, by treaty and not by the
courts. Judicial prediliction for their own views as to limitation of
liability should not prevail over the limitations fixed by the legis-
lature and executive branches of Government ... "
The ticket notice requirements are now spelled out in the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement, adopted after the accident involved in
Lisi. Thus, although American courts have been concerned with
the Warsaw Convention, they have taken the attitude that the
liability limitation of "... ($8,300) is small recompense for the
loss of human life. But so long as our political branches choose
to be bound by this Convention, the judiciary has no choice but to
enforce its restrictive provisions.""
C. The Treaty Involves Non-Judicial Political Questions
It is submitted that a constitutional challenge to the Warsaw
Convention, properly entered into by the executive and legislative
departments of the federal government and administered for over
thirty-nine years by the executive department, falls within the clas-
sification of "political questions" as recently defined by the Su-
preme Court. In Baker v. Carr,5 the Supreme Court described the
factors that would identify such a "political question:"
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly accord-
ing to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a
political question, although each has one or more elements which
identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
-
3 1d. at 515.
'See Kelly v. Sabena, 242 F. Supp. 129, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
5369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by the various departments on one
question."
The Court in Baker emphasized the need, however, for a case
by case inquiry into the issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit echoed this need in United States v. First National City
Bank:'
Mechanical or overbroad rules of thumb are of little value; what
is required is a careful balancing of the interests involved and a
precise understanding of the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case."
Any challenge to the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention
meets the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Baker.
The Constitution has relegated the treaty-making power to the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government. The
overriding interest in the provisions of the Warsaw Convention is
in the executive department which produces policies in interna-
tional affairs that the judiciary should not attempt to regulate. In-
dependent "denunciation" of the Warsaw Convention by the judi-
ciary would show lack of respect due to the executive and legis-
lative branches that have worked for over thirty-nine years to de-
velop and administer international air transportation under the
Warsaw arrangements. And, finally, a judiciary that attempts to
negate the important liability and limitation features of the War-
saw Convention would not only reverse necessary political decisions
that have already been made by the executive department in its
dealings with foreign countries in international air transportation,
but also would cause substantial embarrassment to the United
States Government in its long standing commitments to other coun-
tries under the Treaty.'
Foreign policy "conflicts" between the executive and judicial
branches of the government have historically been held to be po-
litical questions, and the courts have emphasized separation of
power concepts in this area. The Court in Baker" stated that al-
"Id. at 217.
57 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 901.
"See Bishop, Unconstitutional Treaties, 42 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1958).
"OSee Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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though some foreign relations matters lie within the judicial cogni-
zance, a "single voiced statement of the government's views" is
usually demanded. The Court in Baker also cited and quoted from
Oetjen v. Central Leather Company," stating that:
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is com-
mitted by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-
'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decisionY
The courts have also maintained that historical development and
prior governmental action in dealing with foreign countries is of
prime importance when considering the validity of international
treaties. The Supreme Court in Baker stated that "Governmental
action . . . must be regarded as of controlling importance." In
Sayne v. Shipley," provisions of a treaty regulating extradition be-
tween the Canal Zone and Panama were in dispute. The State De-
partment advised the court that the Treaty was still in effect. The
court then stated:
Because we recognize that the conduct of foreign affairs is a po-
litical, not a judicial function such advice, while not conclusive on
this Court is entitled to great weight and importance."
The Supreme Court has also recognized that there are many il-
lustrations in the area of the executive department's conduct of for-
eign relations that involve "considerations of policy, considerations
of extreme magnitude, . . . entirely incompetent to the examination
and decision of a court of justice."" As the Supreme Court has
recognized, such policy matters should be considered not only when
61246 U.S. 297 (1918).
"Id. at 302. See also Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D.C. Kan. 1968),
where the district court said:
Among the questions which have been recognized as political rather
than judicial in nature, none comes more clearly within the form of
classification than those which involve the propriety of acts done in
the conduct of the foreign relations of our government . . . . In-
deed, it appears that the courts have unanimously agreed to refrain
from interfering with that great group of matters involving foreign
relations of the United States with other nations.
Id. at 850.
"See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962).
"418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 684. See also Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 455 (1939).
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clearly definable criteria are available for decision, but also when
possible international consequences are important."
When the various policies, criteria, and international conse-
quences involved in a challenge to the constitutionality of the War-
saw Convention are considered, the applicability of all these fac-
tors to the tests indicated by the Supreme Court in Baker be-
come apparent. Judicial consideration of these matters would not
only violate separation of power concepts, internationally embar-
rass the executive and legislative departments of the government
(after their having adhered to and administered the Treaty and
Agreement under it for many, many years), but also would result
in substantial and adverse consequences to the credibility of the
United States and the direction its foreign policy has taken in its
dealing with other countries in international air transportation.
There can be no doubt that the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Interim Agreement enacted pursuant to its provisions,
are of utmost concern to United States foreign policy in its rela-
tions with other countries. The Warsaw Convention was signed by
the President, the Senate gave its advice and consent, and the
Treaty has been administered by the executive branch of the gov-
ernment for over thirty-nine years. The commercial air fleet of the
United States is the largest and most important one in the world;
regulation of its international air operations, as well as the in-
ternational air operations of other countries has, for the past thirty-
nine years, revolved around the Warsaw Convention and the insti-
tutions and agreements springing from it. There have been innu-
merable statements by courts, government officials, air transport
experts, and foreign policy diplomats and functionaries that show
the very real importance of this Treaty to the stability of interna-
tional air transportation, and the intensity of concern surrounding
it by all countries.
The Department of State has called the Warsaw Convention
"one of the principal multi-lateral agreements applicable to inter-
national air transportation. It . . .creates a uniform body of law
with regard to the rights and responsibility of passengers, shippers,
and air carriers in international transportation.""8 The legal com-
mittee of the International Air Transport Association listed the
6 7 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6832 J. Am L. & COM. 243 (1966).
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".... good features of Warsaw... [including] ... choice of courts,
government law.., and standard forms of traffic documents. Uni-
formity is of great importance to carriers and their customers."6
The courts have reiterated that the Treaty's purpose is "to effect a
uniformity of procedure and remedies." '
Leonard Meeker, legal advisor to the Department of State, in
testimony given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
May 1965, indicated the official attitude of the Department of State
toward the Warsaw Convention:
On the whole, the Department of State believes the Warsaw con-
vention has been beneficial to air transportation and to travelers
... if we had no Convention, many victims of air disasters would
have great difficulty in pursuing effective remedies and securing
prompt recovery in a case of accident occurring over the high seas
or in foreign countries with laws different than our own."
When the United States withdrew its denunciation to the War-
saw Convention in May 1966, the note sent by the United States to
the Polish government further reflected the United States Govern-
ments' strong belief in the Convention's importance: "The United
States of America believes that its continuing objective of uniform-
ity of international law and adequate protection for international
passengers will be best assured within the framework of the War-
1172saw Convention ....
Besides these general statements of the importance of the War-
saw Convention internationaly, federal officials and commentators
in the field have emphasized the Convention's importance to Amer-
ican air commerce, and the negative effect destruction of the Con-
vention's system would have on United States' relations with foreign
governments.
In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Mr. Meek-
er stated that "perhaps the most serious effect of denunciation
would be the damage that such action would have upon the position
69IATA Bull. No. 34 at 18.
70 Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
"Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 2 (1959). See Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw Convention, 34
INs. COUNSEL J. 266 n.5 (1967).
72 Caplan, Insurance, Warsaw Convention, Changes Made Necessary by the
1966 Agreement and Possibility of Denunciation of the Convention, 33 J. AiR
L. & CoM. 663, 670 (1967).
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and prestige of the United States as a world leader in the promotion
of international co-operation in aviation matters."73 He further fore-
cast economic disadvantages: "Such retaliations could take both
political and economic form. For one thing, the billion dollars in
annual aircraft exports from this country could be in danger."'7
Others have forecast technical disadvantages which would result
from any destruction of the Warsaw system. For example, in a let-
ter to Undersecretary of State Thomas Mann, on March 25, 1966,
William F. Mackee, IGIA chairman, stated:
The Federal Aviation Administration feels it extremely important
that the high level of cooperation . . .be continued in the future
...denunciation of the Warsaw Convention could result in de-
terioration of international cooperation in technical aviation mat-
ters. The benefits to the traveling public which have resulted from
the technical agreement achieved in the ICAO have been substan-
tial and have made significant contributions to air safety.'
John E. Steven, general counsel for the ATA, commented that
the United States Government cannot unilaterally modify the War-
saw Convention or impose higher liability limits without under-
mining the system and "destroying the world aviation co-operation
and United States aviation leadership."'"
Andreas Lowenfeld and Allan I. Mendelsohn, Chairman and
delegate, respectively, of the United States delegation to the Mon-
treal Conference in 1966, reported that the dominant attitude at
Montreal was "that if the United States withdrew from Warsaw, the
whole treaty would unravel, with a resultant setback for the uni-
formity of documentation and legal rules achieved through the
Convention."77 As exhaustively reported by both Mr. Lowenfeld
and Mr. Mendelsohn, world governments and airlines worked fran-
tically to reach an agreement on higher liability limits in order to
prevent the United States' denunciation of the Treaty. Even after
the Montreal Conference was dissolved, work continued, and agree-
ment was finally reached only shortly before the denunciation was
7
1 Supra note 71, at 49.741 d. at 71.
75 IGIA file 23/1.3 cited in The 1966 Carrier Agreements: The United States
Retains the Warsaw Convention, 7 VA. J. INT'L LAW 140 (1966).
71 Stephen, The Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, 34 Ins.
L. J. 711, 715 (1966).
77Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 590 (1967).
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to take effect. These efforts by the United States Government, other
governments, and aviation representatives from around the world,
show conclusively that the Treaty and Agreement are of vital im-
portance in inter-governmental relations involving international
air transportation.
The Montreal Interim Agreement was certainly not a unilateral
agreement resulting from a "conspiracy" to cheat injured passen-
gers. The Montreal Interim Agreement resulted from the threat of
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the United States, the
world's greatest power in international air transportation. As a re-
sult of the substantial pressure the United States placed upon other
countries and foreign airlines, an agreement was reached not only
to increase the limit of liability of air carriers to $75,000, but also
to require those carriers to waive certain defenses they otherwise
would have had under the Treaty.
There can be little doubt that destruction of the Warsaw system
would also have negative effects on conflict of laws problems in-
volving international air transportation. For example, local limita-
tions of liability could be inflicted on international air travelers.
While American travelers would probably be less affected by con-
flicts problems, the airline industry would certainly be seriously af-
fected. The rights of an American citizen engaged in a journey be-
tween two foreign points on an American flag carrier are not clear
in the absence of the Treaty. The status of an American citizen in-
jured while on a journey between two foreign points on a foreign
flag carrier is even more in doubt. Damages might be governed by
local law. Choice of law in an accident involving a foreign resident
engaged in a journey to or from the United States on a United
States carrier may or may not depend on a "contacts" theory with
all of its inherent problems of interpretation and proof. A claim on
behalf of a foreign resident engaged in a journey to or from the
United States on a foreign carrier, a claim on behalf of the foreign
resident engaged in a journey between two foreign points on an
American carrier, and a claim on behalf of a foreign resident en-
gaged in a journey between two foreign points on a foreign carrier
would also involve conflicts problems. Virtually all of these prob-
lems are uniformly covered by the Warsaw Convention. 8
A report of the New York City Bar Association asserted that, in
"
1 See note 1 supra.
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the absence of the Warsaw Convention, the market structure and
general need for uniformity would force governments of the world
to bargain about routes, rates, capacity and frequency of flights.
The report also pointed out that in resolving these matters, "bar-
gaining position" would not necessarily depend on adherence to
agreements, but rather would depend upon potential air markets
and willingness or ability to offer reciprocal benefits or retaliation
for another government's restrictions. 9 And, again, the practice
of each nation would obviously be to construe its own rules and
regulations to its own advantage."
Therefore, if the Warsaw Convention did not exist, a trend away
from uniformity and stability in international air law would cer-
tainly result. Concern by the United States Government in the
Warsaw Convention has been and continues to be intense. The
United States Government, other governments, and all major world
airlines have been working for years to modify and compromise
the sometimes conflicting interests involved in the administration
of the Treaty. The mere existence of these continuing efforts by the
executive and legislative branches of the government is the strongest
of reasons for judicial restraint.
In view of the comprehensive character of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the inter-relations of each party to it, it is difficult to un-
derstand how the constitutionality of the monetary limitation can
rationally be challenged separately from the rest of the Treaty. The
Treaty has always been considered as an integral whole revolving
around the liability provisions and monetary limitations. The Unit-
ed States Government never ratified the Hague Protocol because
it was dissatisfied with the low limits. At the Montreal Conference
most negotiations hinged around a revision of the monetary limita-
tion. The proposal of virtually absolute liability contained in the
Montreal Interim Agreement was closely linked to the monetary
limitation itself, and was the reason the airlines originally disagreed
with the proposal, as well as the reason the United States executive
department eventually found it acceptable.
A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more indepen-
dent nations. 1 For any court to judicially abrogate the monetary
"
9See 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 358, 378 (1964).
"See Sand, The International Unification of Air Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 400 (1965).
81 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). The Warsaw Convention Treaty
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limitation would be the worst kind of contractual breach to a for-
eign country or to a foreign airline. Such a breach would result in
an extreme embarrassment to the executive department of the Unit-
ed States, and would also throw the status of all international air
agreements into substantial doubt.
Nor can the monetary limitations be considered separable from
the rest of the treaty in the way some clauses are separable from
statutes. In Williams v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana," the
Supreme Court stated the general rule in this regard:
The general rule is that the unobjectionable part of a statute cannot
be held separable unless it appears that standing alone, legal effect
can be given to it, and that the Legislature intended the provision
to stand in case others included in the act and held bad should fall."'
The Supreme Court added that the primary question is whether the
legislative intent overcomes the heavy presumption that a statute
was to be effective only in its entirety. If the provision complained
of is independent in the sense that its removal will leave the pur-
poses of the statute substantially unaffected, then it can be inferred
that the provision was intended to be separable. Another test is
whether the statute would have been enacted if the provision com-
plained of had been struck out at the time of passage."
In reviewing the intent of the participating governments and
the activities surrounding the passage of the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Interim Agreement, there can be no doubt that
the explicit intent was that the liability provisions and monetary
limitations could not be separable from the rest of the arrangement.
Furthermore, removal of these provisions would undoubtedly elimi-
nate uniformity of international air transportation rules and thus
drastically and adversely affect the purposes of the Treaty.
IV. MONETARY LIMITATION OF RECOVERIES AND THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Statutes in this country that limit liability to various monetary
sums have been part and parcel of American law for many years.
is also regarded as a "contract." See Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
"2278 U.S. 235 (1929).
Id. at 117.
"See also, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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The constitutionality of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, for ex-
ample, has been upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court:
The legislature took away no right when it enacted the statute. It
created both the right and the remedy, and we think that its power
to limit the maximum recovery in the action that it created cannot
be questioned. The fact that most States place no limit upon the
amount recoverable, or that the legislative limit may seem unduly
low when contrasted with recoveries in other actions, does not
affect the power of the legislature or the validity of its action."
Other examples of constitutional limitations of liability are the
Illinois Dram Shop Act," and the Illinois Workmen's Compensa-
tion laws."
Though limited in recent years, the concept of immunity or limi-
tations on liability of charitable institutions has been widely fol-
lowed both nationwide and in Illinois. It is true that Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,"8 said that charitable
immunity in Illinois can no longer stand in light of Molitor v. Kane-
land Community Unit District 302."9 As in Molitor, however, the
Darling court did not hold the immunity concept itself unconstitu-
tional, but said it had been applied in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, and was no longer justified by public policy. The charitable
immunity had allowed charitable institutions to limit their liability
according to the amount of insurance they held, their trust fund
being immune from tort liability."0 This self-serving feature of chari-
table immunity caused its demise in Illinois. Another factor was
the modem structure of liability insurance that enabled charitable
institutions to obtain full protection.
Other states, however, have continued to validly implement the
immunity by more evenhanded administration and retention of a
more paternal attitude over charitable institutions. For example,
85 Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.2d 26, 29, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958). See also Butler
v. C.T.A., 38 Ill.2d 361, 231 N.E.2d 429 (1967).
"O Il. S. H. A. ch. 43, § 135. The Illinois Supreme Court in Knierim v. Izzo,
22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961), held that the $20,000 monetary limitations
contained in the Dram Shop statute were constitutionally valid.
87 Ill. S.H.A. ch. 48, § 138.7 et seq. The Illinois Supreme Court held this
statute constitutionally valid, including all of its monetary limitations. See Keeran
v. Peoria B & C Traction Co., 277 Ill. 413, 115 N.E. 636 (1917).
8833 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
89 18 l.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
"See also, Tidwell v. Smith, 27 Ill. App.2d 63, 169 N.E.2d 157 (1960).
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Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital,9' re-
vealed the growth of a viable scheme of charitable immunity. The
court noted that the public policy of protection of institutions that
are for the benefit of the whole community constitutionally justifies
the retention of charitable immunity. It added that the government
should affirmatively encourage the development of such institutions
using any means necessary, with the reasonableness of the means
and ends sought the only limit to that power. The court in Sanner
noted that although the charitable institutions scheme was not un-
constitutional, a better plan could be found; it then pointed to the
features of a Maryland statute. 2 This statute limits a charitable
institution's liability to the limits of its insurance policies, and sets
the minimum size for the policy at $100,000. The court noted that
the new statute leaves the basic right to bring suit unimpaired, but
still gives protection to charitable institutions.
Sovereign immunity is another valid limitation of liability. This
immunity takes many forms. In Illinois, the State was once pro-
tected by art. 4, section 26 of the (old) constitution, but state sub-
units and local government units were not. They once were immune
according to common law, but Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit District 302" extinguished this immunity, not on basic consti-
tutional grounds, but on the grounds of arbitrary and capricious
administration of the doctrine. Before Molitor a morass of statutory
and common law had developed that regulated governmental sub-
unit liability in many different ways. The court ruled that the re-
sulting hodge-podge itself violated the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. After Molitor, the state legislature
passed a number of bills limiting or extinguishing the liability of
certain units of local government. The Illinois Supreme Court de-
clared many of these bills to be unconstitutional on grounds similar
to those in Molitor." That court has refused to rule whether the
State's sovereign immunity provided by article 4, section 23, con-
" 278 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1968).
" MD. CODE ANNOT. art. 43, § 556A (1966 Supp.), which did not apply to
the case because of its recent passage.
" See Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959).
1See Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964);
Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
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fficted with the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution."
The new Illinois Constitution abolishes sovereign immunity."
Another well known constitutionally valid limitation to causes of
action is the automobile guest statute" that prevents actions against
the driver of an automobile unless wilful and wanton conduct con-
tributed to cause the injury. It should be noted, however, that the
California Supreme Court recently held that the California guest
statute violated the equal protection clause because it was discrimi-
natory and contained irrational exceptions and classifications."
Besides the various state limitations to liability, the federal gov-
ernment limits liability in admiralty and maritime matters." These
statutes generally limit liability in proportion to the tonnage of the
ship and similar factors. The constitutionality of these limitations
has been upheld.'" Likewise, the Supreme Court in Old Dominion
Steamship Co. v. Gilmore,"' upheld a policy provision limiting re-
covery for loss of life and bodily injury according to the tonnage
of the ship involved.' Another federal limitation to liability is the
Longshoreman and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.'
Finally, the federal government limits its own liability by exempt-
ing certain activities from coverage under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,"' or the federal jurisdictional statute.' These exemptions'
are diverse in nature. Sub-section (a) pre-empts application of
strict liability principles to government employees if due care has
been used in the execution of a statute or regulation. Under other
"Edelen v. Hogsett, 44 Ill.2d 215, 254 N.E.2d 435 (1969).
"S.H.A. Const., art. XIII, 5 4.
" See, e.g., S.H.A. ch. 95 , § 10-201; Summers v.. Summers, 40 Ill.2d 338,
239 N.E.2d 795 (1968).
"'Brown v. Merlo, 106 Cal. Rept. 388, 8 Cal.3d 855, 506 P.2d 212 (1973)
held the California automobile guest act as violative of the equal protection
guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions because it was dis-
criminatory and contained irrational exceptions and classifications.
146 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970).
1'"Providence and N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill, 109 U.S. 578 (1883).
101207 U.S. 398 (1907).
'"2 See also Koppers Conn. Coke Company v. James McWilliams Blue Line,
18 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1936), afl'd, 89 F.2d 865, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 706
(1937).
10333 U.S.C. §S 901 et seq. (1970).
'-"28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
1'"28 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (1970).
'"See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
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sub-sections claims arising out of the mail carriage,"°' collection of
customs duty, ' detention of goods,"' and imposition of quaran-
tine are exempted.1 Sub-section (h) exempts "any claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abusive process, liability, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.""
1
Claims in connection with military service are also exempted
from the Federal Tort Claims Act. In Feres v. United States1' the
government was held not liable for the wrongful deaths of several
servicemen suffered in the course of their military service. The
deaths were caused by government negligence involving a barracks
fire and medical malpractice during an operation. The court in
Hale v. United States,"' explained the justification for this doctrine:
The more fundamental reasons for excluding tort actions against
the United States for injuries in active military service pertain to
such factors as military discipline and government immunity from
the results of errors of military judgment."'
The Judicial Code and Judiciary Act"' also exempt claims
arising in a foreign country,"' claims arising from the activity of
the Panama Canal Company,"' claims in regard to the activities of
a federal land bank,"' and activities arising from the operations of
the the Tennessee Valley Authority.""
It is therefore clear that legislative enactments that limit liability,
not only to the amount of damages awarded, but also to the cause
10728 U.S.C. S 2680(b) (1970).
108 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
109Id.
11028 U.S.C. 5 2680(f) (1970).
I" See Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855
(1964), where damages were denied for physical harm allegedly suffered as a
result of false imprisonment and unrequested treatment in a Veteran's Administra-
tion Hospital.
112 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
11"416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
114 Id. at 357.
1528 U.S.C. 5 2680 et seq. (1970).
1128 U.S.C. 5 2680(k) (1970).
1728 U.S.C. 5 2680(m) (1970).
1128 U.S.C. 5 2680(n) (1970).
"'928 U.S.C. 5 2680(l) (1970).
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of action itself, have been part and parcel of American juris-
prudence for many years.
V. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
OF PASSENGERS
The historical developments leading up to the ratification of the
Warsaw Convention, the subsequent developments resulting in the
Montreal Interim Agreement enacted pursuant to the Treaty, and
the substantial concern currently expressed by other governments
and the international air transportation industry concerning the im-
portance of the Treaty in international air travel, demonstrate that
substantial justification existed for the enactment of the Treaty and
Agreement. Neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal
Agreement creates an unconstitutional classification of passengers
to the airlines or manufacturers. They are based on policies de-
termined by the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment, and do not deprive international air travelers of equal pro-
tection of the law because they are rational and in line with the
ends they are designed to meet. They apply equally to the entire
class of international air travelers.
In Levy v. Louisiana"' the Supreme Court set the rule for equal
protection attacks on limitations of liability. In Levy, five illegiti-
mate children sued for the wrongful death of their mother. The
state court denied recovery because it interpreted the word "child"
in the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statute to include only legitimate
offspring. ' The Supreme Court emphasized the intimate familial
relationship between a child and his own mother, and held that in
cases such as this the biological relationship should rule over the
legal, since any other rule would not be "rational." Levy involved
discrimination within one class of plaintiffs.
Passengers, as international air travelers, are members of the
class affected by the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Interim
Agreement, and therefore there is no rational basis for them to
contend" that they are being discriminated against. They are
treated the same as all other similarly situated persons of the same
class. The fact that airplane manufacturers, airport authorities, and
120391 U.S. 68 (1968).
121 192 So.2d 193 (1966).
'= See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) where plaintiffs did have grounds
for claiming discrimination.
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governmental units do not come within the scope of the Warsaw
Convention or Montreal Interim Agreement does not make the
Treaty discriminatory to passengers. No case exists in which either
airplane manufacturers, airport authorities, or governmental units
have contended that the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement are unconstitutional simply because liability rules affect-
ing them are not restricted or limited in the same manner as those
applied to international air carriers.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Levy qualified its opin-
ion by stating that "in applying the Equal Protection Clause
to social and economic legislation, we give great latitude to
the legislature in making classification.' '.. In Levy the social clas-
sification was "invidious" since it forced the plaintiff to operate
under social handicaps. On the other hand, the classification of
international air travelers under the Treaty is a purely economic
classification and the passenger's social status is totally irrelevant.
The general rule about classification was further articulated by
the Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. State of Florida,'" when the
Court stated that the legislative classification must not be arbitrary
and:
... must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable
and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is
proposed and can never be made arbitrarily; and without any such
basis .... [A]rbitrary selection can never be justified by calling
it classification"2
The Court added that classification must always be viewed in light
of its purpose, and ruled that "normally the widest discretion is
allowed the legislative judgment . . . normally that judgment is
given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might
suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than
arbitrary and invidious."'"
In McLaughlin, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of an
unmarried black man and. unmarried white woman who had been
living together in violation of a Florida statute.'" Since the statute
123391 U.S. at 71.
-379 U.S. 184 (1964).
113 Id. at 190.
12 1Id. at 191.
"' See 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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imposed heavier burdens on inter-racial couples than on couples
of the same color, the Court ruled that such discrimination on the
basis of race was socially "invidious" and therefore was an illegal
classification. No socially "invidious" issue is involved in any case
involving an international air traveler. Only economic classifica-
tions are involved; and each passenger has the same rights under
the treaty as all other passengers.
The concept of "invidious" or "social classifications" as com-
pared to "economic classification" was further explained by Judge
Marovitz 2' in Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
The Supreme Court has been noticeably more reluctant to inter-
fere with state policy where economic interest as distinguished from
the 'basic civil rights of man', are involved. This reluctance has
prompted at least one writer to state that the Equal Protection
Clause has 'two sides'-one imposing a definition of reasonable-
ness for classifications involving economic interests which is 'com-
fortably loose', and the other rigorously scrutinizing any classifi-
cation which impinges upon the 'basic civil rights of man'."
In Morey v. Doud,"° the Supreme Court articulated certain
standards involving economic classification while declaring uncon-
stitutional an Illinois special interest statute which gave one com-
pany an economic advantage over others. 3'
Taking all .. .factors in conjunction-the remote relationship of
the statutory classification to the Act's purpose or to business char-
acteristics, and the creation of a closed class by the singling out of
the money orders of a named company, with accompanying eco-
nomic advantages-we hold that the application of the act to ap-
pellees deprives them of equal protection of the laws."'
In Morey, the Supreme Court stated that the legislative classifica-
tion in that case deserved especially careful scrutiny because the
discrimination indicated in the legislation was of "an unusual char-
acter."'33 No such situation even remotely exists in a case involving
a passenger.
"' District Judge, Northern District of Illinois.
123 274 F. Supp. 169, 177 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also 61 MicH. L. REV. 645,
666 (1963).
130 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
"3 Illinois Community Currency Exchange Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 16 +,
$ 30-56.3 (1955).
133 354 U.S. at 469.
I's id. at 464.
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The Supreme Court in Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas,"
upheld a New York statute that created rules which treated one
class of mineral water well operators differently from another. The
Supreme Court in Lindsley reiterated the rules for testing dis-
crimination or unconstitutional classification under the fourteenth
amendment:
1. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of policy
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in
that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of. facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis,
but is essentially arbitrary.'
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld legislative classifica-
tions involving economically-based rules.'
Uninhibited economic classification is even more widespread
in the dealings of the United States with foreign governments.
Tariffs effectively discriminate against different goods within the
same class--domestic versus foreign textiles, for example. Con-
sumers who have nothing to do with the creation of the classifica-
tion are nevertheless often constitutionally "penalized" in the inter-
1-220 U.S. 61 (1911).
's' Id. at 78-79.
"' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also, Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers' Assn., 360 U.S. 334 (1959); Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Daniel
v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Car-
michael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Borden's Farm Products Co.
v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S.
550 (1935); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco G. Co., 276 U.S. 71
(1928); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912); Magoun v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
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est of economics and foreign affairs. Likewise, American manu-
facturers who sell to certain countries, e.g., Cuba, when the United
States forbids the sale of certain goods, are discriminated against,
as compared to manufacturers who sell the same goods to other
countries, such as Canada. This form of classification has been
deemed constitutional. 137
It is therefore clear under United States Supreme Court rulings
that economic classifications are invested with a heavy presumption
of validity, especially when they are made in the context of this
country's relations with other countries. The liability restrictions to
air carriers, and the liability limitations to international air travelers
under the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment are legitimate implementations of legitimate and necessary
ends determined by the executive. They are not arbitrary, having
been developed over a period of thirty-nine years through exten-
sive diplomatic conferences among various governments and world-
wide representatives of the international airline industry.
It is sometimes alleged that the Montreal Interim Agreement and
Warsaw Convention resulted from some sort of airline conspiracy
to cheat international air travelers. It is submitted that such an
argument borders on the ridiculous. The Montreal Interim Agree-
ment was authorized by the Treaty's Article 22(1) which sets out
the liability and adds: "Nevertheless, by special contract, carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." The
Montreal Interim Agreement not only complies precisely with the
Warsaw Convention, but its form, and the process by which it was
concluded, adopted, and approved, give it many of the attributes
of an executive agreement. Most major airlines in the world, in-
cluding those that fly into and out of the United States, have
adhered to it. Most foreign airlines are government owned, so that
their adherence to the Agreement has the effect of agreements of
their respective governments. Also, each participating foreign gov-
ernment was required to transmit approval of the Agreement to
the State Department at this government's request. The United
States formally approved the Montreal Interim Agreement through
a Civil Aeronautics Board order."'
"' See, e.g., DeGeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
"I CAB Order No. E-23680, CAB Agreement No. 18900 (May 13, 1966), 31
Fed. Reg. 7301, 7302 (1966).
THE WARSAW SYSTEM
Moreover, the historical events leading up to the Montreal In-
terim Agreement reveal clearly the roles played by both the United
States and other governments. As of 1961, the United States had
not ratified the Hague Protocol, that had initially been proposed in
1955. Since the United States Government wished higher liability
limits, the State Department attempted to have the Hague Protocol
ratified in combination with a required program of insurance. Al-
though studies of desired compensation and the feasibility of higher
limits were made by the State Department, no successful action
by Congress could be obtained, so that in 1965 denunciation of
the entire Warsaw Convention was considered in order to pressure
such an agreement. The United States Government formed a high
level working group composed of representatives from the Depart-
ment of State, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Avia-
tion Administration. These groups developed the opinions and pro-
posals that were discussed at the Montreal Conference, which con-
vened under the threat of United States' denunciation of the War-
saw Convention. The Montreal Convention was convened with
delegates from fifty-nine nations of the world. After much debate,
the Conference foundered, and it appeared that the threatened de-
nunciation by the United States would become effective. The Inter-
national Air Transport Association, working closely with the United
States State Department, however, managed to hammer out a com-
promise agreement. Consent was obtained from the carriers, and
at the State Department's request, from other governments involved
in the Conference. There is no doubt that at all times, the United
States Government was the pivotal party from which sprang sub-
stantive suggestions, modifications, and, even more important, ap-
proval by various foreign governments and the international air
carriers.'"
With reference to the monetary limitation contained in the
Montreal Interim Agreement, at the conclusion of their monu-
mental work, Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn state:
We have seen that the limit in the interim agreement was set as the
result of a political compromise, and only quite indirectly in re-
sponse to economic analysis. But the available statistics, for ex-
I'See Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 517
(1967) and Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497 (1967).
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ample the figures shown in Tables 1-2 above, may well not be a
meaningful guide in terms of the real value of recoveries, since
they do not reflect experience with the settlement techniques sug-
gested above. On the other hand, the trend in accident compensa-
tion may soon outstrip these figures, making the $75,000 figure
appear too low. All that can be said here is that a $75,000 limit
per person looks reasonable at this time. '
Moreover, the United States and other governments as well as the
international air industry are presently engaged in considering addi-
tional revisions to the Warsaw Convention including an increase
in the limits of liability."
VI. CONCLUSION
American courts have specifically upheld the validity of the
Warsaw Convention under the United States Constitution. Even
though the United States Supreme Court has indicated that inter-
national treaties may be subject to some constitutional limitations,
no properly enacted treaty has yet been declared unconstitutional.
In practice, the Supreme Court has treated questions of the
validity of international treaties in much the same manner as it has
treated non-justiciable political questions. The same policies that
restrain the judiciary from considering certain political questions
are applicable to constitutional issues involving international air
transportation under the Treaty. Judicial restraint is essential be-
cause the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment are vital elements in the scheme of international air trans-
portation and thus equally vital elements in the scheme of Ameri-
can foreign relations. Statements and actions of political leaders
of the United States and other governments over the years regard-
ing the Treaty and Agreement overwhelmingly support this view.
The appropriateness of judicial review of the Treaty aside,
neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment in any event deprives a passenger of his property without due
process of law. Monetary limitations on damages awarded, as well
as limitations to causes of action themselves, are not novel to
American jurisprudence. There is substantial judicial precedent for
imposing constitutional limits to liability on otherwise valid causes
140 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 139, at 602 (emphasis added).
141 See notes 18-19 supra.
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of action: e.g., actions for wrongful death, dram shop, workmen's
compensation, admiralty and maritime, actions against the gov-
ernment, charities, etc. The United States Constitution requires
only that such limitations on liability comply with equal protec-
tion and due process principles through their application by ra-
tional and nonarbitrary means. The policy behind the Warsaw sys-
tem, and the implementation of the Treaty during the past thirty-
nine years, meet those requirements.
Nor does the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment deny a passenger equal protection under the law. The clas-
sification of all international air travelers is economic in character
and sufficiently reasonable and just in relation to the end it is de-
signed to meet to withstand all constitutional tests established by
the United States Supreme Court. All international air travelers
subject to the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Interim Agree-
ment are treated similarly.
Since the stability of world air travel hinges to a large extent on
the stability of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Interim
Agreement, they are both of paramount importance in furthering
the relations of the United States with foreign governments in inter-
national air commerce. Statements and actions of the executive
branch of government over the years clearly reflect this importance.
Given the foreign policy ramifications of the entire Warsaw system,
it is not rationally possible to eliminate the limitation of liabilty
provisions without torpedoing the entire system, thus incurring far-
reaching and adverse effects on world air commerce. Considering
the Treaty both in contract and in statutory terms, the liability
limitation is a vital and inseparable part of it.
The Montreal Interim Agreement, in effect an executive agree-
ment, was made pursuant to, and is itself a valid part of, the larger
Warsaw Convention that authorizes international air carriers to
contract specially with passengers in order to set higher liability
limits if they wish. The Montreal Interim Agreement is certainly
not a private "plot" by international air carriers to deny passengers
any rights. Indeed, the entire history and background of the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement clearly reveal the leadership role played by
the executive department of the United States in its development.
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